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Abstract
We investigate the behavior of aggregate hours supplied by workers in permanent
(open-ended) contracts and temporary contracts, distinguishing changes in employ-
ment (extensive margin) and hours per worker (intensive margin). We focus on the
differences between the Great Recession and the start of the COVID-19 Recession. In
theGreatRecession, the loss in aggregate hours is largely accounted for by employment
losses (hours per worker did not adjust) and initially mainly by workers in temporary
contracts. In contrast, in the early stages of the COVID-19 Recession, approximately
sixty percent of the drop in aggregate hours is accounted for by permanent workers
that do not only adjust hours per worker (beyond average) but also face employment
losses—accounting for one-third of the total employment losses in the economy. We
argue that our comparison across recessions allows for a more general discussion on
the impact of adjustment frictions in the dual labor market and the effects policy, in
particular the short-time work policy (ERTE) in Spain.
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In Spain, employment responds strongly to downturns. This phenomenon is often
linked to the dual nature of the Spanish labor market in which workers with temporary
contracts (“temps”) coexist with workers with open-ended or permanent contracts
(“perms”). The idea is that temps are much easier to lay off than perms and, hence, the
flow out of employment during recessions is largely accounted for by temps (Bentolila
and Dolado 1994; Bentolila et al. 2020).1 Hence, in a typical economic downturn such
as the Great Recession, the loss of temp employment explains most of the loss in
the aggregate hours of the total economy.2 We show that this is not the case in the
COVID-19 Recession.
Different response of thedual labormarket to theGreatRecession andCOVID-19
In sharp contrast to previous recessions,wefind that both perms and temps contribute to
the loss of aggregate hours during COVID-19. Putting together the effects of employ-
ment and hours per worker, we show that perms account for the largest share—sixty
percent—of the loss in aggregate hours in 2020Q2. This is explained by the fact
that unlike in previous recessions: (1) Perms suffer losses in employment early in
the recession—accounting for one-third of the total economy employment losses in
2020Q2, and (2) the COVID-19 response comes with a substantial downward adjust-
ment in hours per worker that, at the same time, is larger for perms than for temps.
These features persist and, one year into the recession, the larger relative contribution
of perms to the loss of aggregate hours stands in 2021Q1.
In more detail, in the second quarter of the COVID-19 Recession—which largely
overlaps with the national lockdown against the pandemic, we find that (weekly)
aggregate hours in the total economy drop by four—an absolute deviation from their
deseasonalized trend. This is a massive downward deviation from trend of approxi-
mately thirty percent on impact. The negative impact on aggregate hours is initially
milder in the Great Recession, and it builds up slowly thereafter. In terms of the dual
labor market behavior, we find substantial differences between the aggregate hours of
perms and temps across these two recessions.While only the aggregate hours of temps
react—and gradually so—during the first year of the Great Recession, the aggregate
hours of both perms and temps drop on impact in the COVID-19 Recession. Further,
perms account for the largest share of the drop experienced in the total economy upon
impact and this is still the case by 2021Q1.
The explicit distinction between employment and hours per worker separately for
perms and temps turns out to be critical in order to understand the differential drivers
behind the behavior of aggregate hours across recessions. In 2020Q2, employment
(per working-age population) drops by 4.3 percentage points in the total economy and
perms account for approximately one-third of that loss. In terms of hours per worker,
we find an unprecedented large drop of 6.5 (weekly) hours per worker in the total
economy. Splitting the sample between perms and temps, we find that perms drop
1 Note that firms can decide not to renew temporary contracts. This choice does not show as a layoff, but
it increases the flow out of employment.
2 Indeed, the fluctuations in aggregate hours—the product between employment and hours per worker—are
understood to be largely driven by employment (Cooley and Prescott 1995).
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7.1 hours per worker—larger than the average adjustment in the total economy—
whereas temps adjust their hours per worker downward by 5.5. These patterns are in
stark contrast to the Great Recession which was largely accounted for by employment
losses—hours per worker did not adjust—and initially mainly by temps.
Why the different response: the nature of the recession or policy? A potential
rationale for the different responses of the dual labor market across recessions is the
different nature of the Great Recession and the COVID-19 Recession. This differential
nature shows in the heterogeneous response of the labormarket across industries. First,
in the onset of theGreatRecession the construction sectorwas clearly themost affected.
This sector also had large shares of temp workers, which explains the sharp instant
decline of temp hours and employment, while perms were relatively unaffected in the
first quarters of the recession. Manufacturing industries related to construction also
suffer more, and after some quarters, the financial sector was also largely affected. But
for the rest of the economy, it took time to build up the losses. In contrast, in theCOVID-
19 Recession hospitality and retail were by far the most affected—both because of
the fall in demand for in-person services and because of the forced closures during
lockdown.3 In contrast, industries that could shift to remote work and those deemed
essential activities were less affected by the COVID-19 crisis, in particular, earlier
in the recession. At the same time, the COVID-19 Recession differs from previous
recessions not only in its nature—asymmetrically affecting industries in manner that
differs by recession—but also in the set of unprecedented economic policies put forth
to prevent business closures and employment losses. In particular, a new short-time
work policy (Expediente de Regulación Temporal de Empleo, ERTE) was instated
few days after the beginning of the national lockdown.4
Here, we show that the aggregate patterns that we document on the behavior of
employment and hours of perms and temps across recessions stand within industries.
We take this finding as suggestive evidence that the differential response of the dual
labor market across recessions is likely due to policy rather than the different nature of
the recessions. This includes the set of policies implemented to cushion the COVID-19
Recession, in particular, theERTEs.However, identifying the isolated effects ofERTEs
is problematic given the package of alternative policy measures that was implemented
almost simultaneously; see our discussion in Sect. 2.3.5 In this context, in order to
explore the potential role of the ERTEs we simply re-conduct our analysis removing
from our sample of employed individuals the population that reports being under
ERTEs. This exercise helps us highlight the different behavior of employment (and
hours per worker) of the actual economy (benchmark sample) with ERTEs versus
an alternative view of the same economy where the individuals under ERTE are not
3 Hospitality and retail are also sectors with a naturally higher share of temps, so we could expect employ-
ment loses on impact as large as construction in the Great Recession. Or even higher, as forced closures
could translate into business shutdowns, which would affect perms much more than in the Great Recession.
4 Short-time work policies are defined by the 2020 European Commission as “public programs that allow
firms experiencing economic difficulties to temporarily reduce the hours worked while providing their
employees with income support from the State for the hours not worked.”
5 Isolating the effects of an specific COVID-19 policy is challenging given the quarterly frequency of our




considered employed (i.e., a restricted sample that excludes individuals with ERTEs
from the employed population).
With this exercise, we find that the ERTEs, in addition to preventing employment
losses, help explain approximately half of the drop in hours per worker. This reasoning
is also in Eyméoud et al. (2021a) drawing from an international comparison between
the USA and some countries in the European Union that implement short-time work
policies. At the same time, our analysis shows that the ERTEs do not sustain a scenario
whereby the sole margin of adjustment is in hours per worker. In particular, perm
workers suffer large employment losses evenwithERTEsduringCOVID-19.However,
the duality of the labor market is still present during COVID-19 in the same direction
as in the Great Recession in the sense that temps show larger employment losses than
perms in relative terms, as percentage deviations from their respective trends, by a
factor of five. Interestingly, we find that this duality—or inequality—result in terms of
employment is in large part sustained by the ERTEs that asymmetrically benefit perms.
Indeed, in the restricted sample without ERTEs, the differential factor of employment
losses between perms and temps drops from five to two. Further, the more flexible
adjustment of hours per worker cannot be fully attributed to the ERTEs since hours
per worker also substantially drop for individuals without ERTEs. With or without the
ERTEs, we find similar magnitudes in the drop of hours across perms and temps. Part
of the drop in hours per worker that we document for the sample economy without
ERTEs could be partly explained by the 2012 reform that not only lowered the lay-
off costs for perms but also increased the ability to re-negotiate at the firm level the
collective sector-level agreements regarding hours which increased the flexibility of
hours per worker (Doménech et al. 2018).
Insights from the aggregate hours of perms and temps and a static model
Acknowledging the limited ability to empirically assess the impact of the ERTEs
in explaining the different behavior of the dual labor market across recessions, we
further assess the hypothesized mechanism for ERTEs constructing a static model—
with some degree of complementarity between the perms and temps. Since the model
is based on aggregate hours separately for perms and temps, we provide additional
empirical insights that describe the complete path of aggregate hours by type of worker
during the Great Recession and the COVID-19. Empirically, we show that the neg-
ative impact on perms took years to build during the Great Recession, but occurred
right at the start of the recession during COVID-19. This implies that early in the
Great Recession—approximately the first six quarters that follow 2008Q1, the ratio of
temp hours to perm hours declines noticeably, whereas the level of perm hours barely
changes. That is, the adjustment comes from temp hours early in the Great Reces-
sion. In a second part of the recession, from approximately 2010Q2 to 2013Q2, the
decline in the temp to perm hours ratio slows down. Since permanent hours drop more
noticeably in this second part of the recession, the margin of adjustment flips from
temps to perms. As a result, we find a J-pattern between the temp-to-perm hours ratio
and the hours of permanent workers during the Great Recession in Spain from 2008
to 2013. Then, in the initial phases of the recovery—from 2014 to 2016—the ratio
of temporary to permanent hours grows at the same time that perm hours increase.
Hence, the evolution of temp hours and perm hours during the Great Recession and
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its recovery are well summarized by a clockwise loop pattern. As we document, these
features are largely shared across industries.
We find that our model can generate the clockwise hours adjustment that we doc-
ument for the dual labor market during the Great Recession (a high labor adjustment
friction scenario). Then, we use this framework as a device to explore how the ERTEs
(that ease the labor friction) can help explaining the patterns of aggregate hours of
perms and temps during COVID-19. By construction, this model abstracts from any
dynamic considerations such as the fact that firms potentially face a dynamic trade-off
between having a stable workforce—saving on hiring costs and accumulating skills—
and their ability to adapt to negative shocks. In our static setting, this trade-off is
partly captured—in a reduced form manner—through a technological complemen-
tarity between temps and perms.6 Qualitatively, we find that the introduction of the
ERTEs in the model delivers similar dynamics as those that we document for the
COVID-19 Recession which, we believe, reassures the role of the ERTEs in helping
explain the documented patterns. We leave a more careful quantitative analysis of the
ERTEs with dynamic considerations for future research.
Further empirical insights from business dynamics and parents labor supply
Although we cannot empirically identify the causal channels behind of the large dif-
ferences between the dual labor market behavior during the Great Recession and
COVID-19, the distinct set of policies instituted during COVID-19 intuitively affect
the labor market in ways that line up with the empirical patterns we document. First,
despite the initial response with a national lockdown of non-essential business activity,
we do not see larger employment losses—neither business closures—during COVID-
19 than in the Great Recession. A natural candidate for this result is the ERTEs. The
ERTEs can lower the operational costs of businesses—allowing firms to stay afloat—
with a contractual arrangement that aims to reduce layoffs for a period of, initially,
6 months.7 Further, in contrast to the Great Recession, we also find a reduction in
business closures during COVID-19 which are also likely driven by a combination of
the ERTEs and additional financial aid measures—credit—to firms. Second, another
channel that may explain the sharp employment and hours losses in 2020Q2 is the
effect of school closures on labor supply.8 Our data do not allow us to identify house-
holds with school-aged children, so instead we proxy that variable by focusing on the
middle-agedmarriedworkers.Married individuals suffer larger hours and employment
losses than singles, with married women in particular being most affected. However,
these differences are relatively small in the aggregate and thus we conclude that school
6 Although limited by its static nature, our discussion points to the importance of using a dynamic setting
to assess both the role of firing costs and the effects of COVID-19 policy as a path for future research.
Indeed, the available evidence strongly suggests the use of explicitly dynamic, stochastic, frictional models
of dual labor markets, in the line of, e.g., Bentolila et al. (2012a) or Costain et al. (2010), which if adapted to
the current policy environment could help us understand better the situation and policy choices in COVID
times.
7 As explained later, if firms lay off employees subject to ERTEs, they must return the subsidies received
in full.
8 The impact is very different across industries, as ERTEs alter the challenges faced by parents: Those in
ERTEs can tend to children at home without losing their jobs. Those who cannot take leave face harsher
constraints. We are currently working on this issue in a separate project.
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closures and other care duties during lockdown are unlikely to explain the fall in hours
we observe—although they may help explain the impact of the recession on parents,
particularly women.
We discuss our data and the institutional background in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we
describe the dual labor market behavior from the late 1980s to the present, compare
its response to the Great Recession and COVID-19, and provide a an exploratory
discussion on the role ERTEs in explaining the observed patterns. In Sect. 4, we
briefly outline a simple static model that helps us rationalize some of the patterns that
we uncover. In Sect. 5, we conduct a robustness cross-industry analysis and discuss
further context in terms of the role of policy on business closures (and formation) and
paternal labor supply. Our last section concludes.
2 Data and context
In this section, we first describe the data we use in our analysis in Sect. 2.1. Second,
we discuss the institutional context of labor market duality in Sect. 2.2 and summarize
the COVID time line in Spain in Sect. 2.3.
2.1 Data
We use the confidential, expanded version of the Spanish labor force survey (Encuesta
de poblacion activa, EPA) provided by the National Statistics Institute (INE). This
version differs from the freely available version in that it contains more detailed data,
including anonymized household identifiers that allow us to connect households inter-
viewed in consecutive surveys. The survey has a quarterly rotating panel structure
with over 100,000 observations per quarter, where households are followed for six
quarters.9 Representativity is kept through population weights, which we will apply
throughout this paper. Our data start in the second quarter of 1987 and go until the first
quarter of 2021. These data are used by Eurostat and other international organizations
such as the OECD or the World Bank.
Like other datasets of its kind, the EPA has suffered changes in survey design
though the years. The most important ones happened in 1992, 1999, and 2005. For
the purpose of this paper, the most relevant change is the 2005 redesign, which mod-
ernized the interview process, increased its coverage, and adapted the sample to make
it more representative of the population in 2005—most notably, to take into account
the substantial demographic changes in Spain in the early 2000s. The changes in the
survey improved the coverage of short employment spells and marginally attached
workers. The change was implemented in a way which did not affect the stocks of
employed workers, but it did create a noticeable discontinuity in the labor state flows
[see Lafuente (2020) for more details]. In this context, it is particularly interesting for
our study the fact that we do not find discontinuities in the series of employment or
9 This is similar to other rotating labor force panels with some differences in the frequency and the length
of the panel. For example, in the Current Population Survey in the USA individuals are interviewed four
consecutive months in year t and, after a span of 8 months without interviews, individuals are interviewed
for an additional set of four consecutive months in year t + 1.
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hours that emerge from the EPA.We do find twominor changes: a change in temporary
employment and a minor break in hours per worker (as reflected in Fig. 2). The dis-
continuity in hours per worker is driven by the increased weight given to respondents
engaged in casual work. Since we mostly focus on the 2008 and 2020 recessions, our
study is not affected by these survey changes insofar we use data starting in 2005Q1
in order to generate the projected counterfactual trends of the 2008 recession. In the
instances where we use a longer time series before 2005Q1, we correct for the survey
changes with a dummy in 2005Q1—net of a trend within a two-year window from
2004Q1 to 2006Q1—which captures the discrete change observed in that quarter.
Labor market variables We focus on aggregate hours per working-age population
(H ) defined as the product of employment per working-age population (e) and hours
per worker (h).10 Then, taking into account the dual market with two types of workers,
perms (P) and temps (T ), the aggregate hours in the total economy are,
H = HP + HT = h P eP + hT eT .
Further, note that we can rewrite H = he where average hours per worker in
the aggregate economy are weighted by the share of each type of employment
h = h P se,P + hT se,T with sg = ege and g = {P, T }, that is,
H = he = (h P se,P + hT se,T )e,
which implies that we can describe the behavior of aggregate hours by understanding
the behavior of e, the employment shares of P and T , and the hours per worker of P
and T .
2.2 Labor market duality
Since the de-regularization of temporary contracts that took place in 1984, Spain has
become a stand-out case of dual labor markets in the OECD. With unemployment
soaring over 20% at the time, Spain sought to introduce flexibility at the margin:
preserving very stringent employment protection (EPL) for regular workers, while
allowing firms to hire through temporary contracts with very little dismissal costs
(Bentolila and Dolado 1994). Before the 1984 reform, only certain industries and
under special circumstances were allowed to use these contracts. In the years after the
reform, the contracts became widely used: By 1992, more than 30% of all workers
were in temporary contracts, as the bottom right panel of Fig. 2 shows.
With the drawbacks of temporary contracts becoming more apparent, attempts to
substantially lower the reliance on temporary contracts have proven less successful,
though some reduction has been achieved over the next 30 years. In the time series
in Fig. 2, we can observe the relatively modest success of the reforms (Dolado et al.
2002) in the 1990s. Then, in the first half of the 2000s the construction sector, in which
10 Given that hours per worker is a margin that can be used to adjust aggregate hours, we focus on the
(self-)reported actual hours worked (last week). That is, “Number of effective hours devoted to this [main]
job last week” or Numero de horas efectivas que dedico a este trabajo la semana pasada in Spanish.
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temporary work was most prevalent, grew considerably faster than others, pushing up
the temporary-to-permanent ratio [see Dolado et al. (2002) for more details]. A further
reform in 2006 generated an impact, e.g., through ending the social security subsidies
for conversions of temporary to permanent employment by the end of the year 2007,
generating a substantial spike in conversions to permanent (visible in the bottom and
upper left panels of Fig. 2 between 2006 and 2007), but with short-lived effect.11
After the Great Recession of 2008, a new labor reform was announced in 2012.
Crucially, this reform allowed greater powers to firms to set the working conditions,
which was reflected in wages but also in hours: There is evidence that the reform
increased the use of part-time work and other flexible hours arrangements [see, e.g.,
Doménech et al. (2018) and Stepanyan and Salas (2020)]. However, even though it
introduced a reduction in the severance payments for permanent workers, the reform
failed to solve the duality of the labor market, [see Bentolila et al. (2012b), Bentolila
et al. (2012c) and Bentolila et al. (2020)]. These cuts left firing costs that still appear
to be sufficiently high to push firms toward using temporary contracts as their main
margin of adjustment (Bentolila et al. 2020). Overall, over the 2010s, the share of
temporary workers and hours has grown back slightly to about 25% of the total, so
duality remains an important feature of the Spanish labor market, and even more so
for the young and less educated workers.
Temporary contracts with strict limitations on their renewal, as in Spain, have
been associated with many labor market distortions (e.g., in terms of human capital
accumulation, the technology and skillmix, and intergenerational inequality and equity
(Alonso-Borrego et al. 2005; Caggese and Cuñat 2008; Cahuc et al. 2016; Caggese
et al. 2019;Guner et al. 2020). These considerations do not only operate in the long run,
but also in response to short run shocks. Below, we compare and contrast the empirical
patterns of adjustment of temporary and permanentwork during the crisis years (2008–
2013) with the COVID Recession, also to help inform theories and measurement of
these distortions.
2.3 The COVID-19 crisis in Spain
As the COVID-19 impact came with various time-varying restrictions on production,
labor supply, and demand, we first summarize the COVID-19 time line in Spain before
spelling out in more detail the ERTE policy.
2.3.1 A time line of the epidemic
The first confirmed COVID-19 infection in Spain happened on January 31, 2020.12
During the month of February, cases were mostly imported, which prompted the
chief of the Coordination Centre for Sanitary Emergencies (Centro de CoordinaciAn
de Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias), Fernando SimAn, to reassure the population
that Spain would see mostly a few imported cases, but it would not become signif-
icantly affected by the pandemic. However, the first known locally transmitted case
11 See Conde-Ruiz et al. (2010) for more details on the impact of this reform.
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Fig. 1 GDP of Spain across recessions (right panel: COVID Recession outtake). Note: GDP Figures from
Eurostat (2021). The units are millions of chained 2010 Euros, seasonally adjusted
was recorded on 26 February. Confirmed cases increased exponentially subsequently:
They grew from 73 on 1March to 589 on 8March to 5,753 on 14March. This leads to
the government declaring the state of alarm on 15 March and implements a national
lockdown. This came almost a week after Italy declared a similar lockdown on 9
March.
The lockdown was supposed to last 15 days, but it was effectively extended until
21 June, thus covering nearly all of the second quarter. Some restrictions were eased
progressively. From 15 March until 13 April, all non-essential economic activities
were closed down. After that day, workers in some non-essential sectors, such as
construction and industry, and those who could not work remotely were allowed to
return to work. Schools remained closed, however.
After a less restricted summer, the start of the second wave in the fall precipitated
the return to the state of alarm on 24 October. It was only lifted on May 9, 2021. How-
ever, this lockdown measures were softer, with most economic activities except the
hospitality sector allowed to carry out as normal. The management of the restrictions
was also decentralized to the regional level, resulting in substantial heterogeneity in
restrictions in the second lockdown.
In Fig. 1, we plot the evolution of the real gross domestic product in Spain over the
(technically) twin recessions that we consider jointly as the “Great Recession” (from
the second quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2013), and the COVID Recession
(which followed the peak in the fourth quarter of 2019).13 Since the latter involves
large swings from quarter to quarter, which dwarf the smaller but more persistently
accumulating negative quarterly growth rates during the Great Recession, we present
a separate graph of our last ten quarters (2018Q4–2021Q1) under consideration in the
right panel. During COVID times, we observe a large drop, nearly 18%, in the second
quarter, followed by a large, but still incomplete recovery in 2020Q3. This, in turn,
is followed by a small subsequent drop in GDP, during what was the second state of
alarm.
13 According to the Spanish Economic Association, the first recession lasted from 2008Q2 to 2009Q4 and




In Spain, an important response to the economic impact of the COVID crisis was
regulated by the Real Decreto-ley 8/2020 on 18 March—4 days after the imposition
of the national lockdown. Most notably, this law introduced the ERTEs, a short-time
work policy that allows firms and workers to agree to a suspension of employment
where the worker still receives a proportional amount of her regular salary (typically
70%), paid fromher social security contributions. In regular times, theworkerwould be
consuming her own unemployment insurance allowance for the duration of an ERTE.
Instead, during the COVID Recession, the worker can use the ERTE preserving her
unemployment insurance time allowance, while the firm saves the social contributions
it pays—as long as it does not dismiss any worker in the 6 months after the end of the
short-time work period.14,15 For temporary workers, their contracts are automatically
extended for the duration of the short-time work scheme. If the firm fires any worker
(before their contract ends) in the 6 months after the first worker is back to work from
short-time work, all subsidies perceived by the firm must be returned in full to the
administration. However, it is worth noting that the firm can chose to not renew any
temporary contracts that expire in those 6 months.16 For the purposes of this paper,
we treat ERTE as creating flexibility on the hours margin, without dismissal, for the
quarters under consideration.
Other important economic measures included 100.000 million euros for firms and
self-employedworkers to use as co-lateral for credit, and10.000million euros extended
to ICO, the public credit institute, for immediate liquidity needs of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). The deadline for the payment of taxes and duties was extended
as well.17
2.3.3 Timing of economic policy and the lockdown
The frequency of the data for this paper is quarterly,18 which implies that we cannot
separate the impact of the COVID crisis (which started in late February), the impact
of the lockdown (declared in mid-March, phased out May–June) and the impact of the
14 The cost of this measure is still unclear after a year into the crisis. Part of the reason for this is that
the government is not spending anything directly as a result of the ERTE, but rather the workers are
consuming their allowance.Therefore, estimates of the cost vary considerably evenbygovernment estimates.
A generally accepted estimate is 4,000 million euros on average per month until September 2020 and about
3,500 million euros per month thereafter. The number falls down as workers under ERTE fall. Just by this
estimate, it can be seen that the money invested in ERTEs is far superior to other credit or subsidies firms
received in this period.
15 There are special provisions for workers with more than one active job and workers affected between
October 2020 and January 2021. For the duration of the COVID short-time work, firms with less than 50
employees do not pay social contributions for the worker, and large firms pay only 25% of the regular
amount. For more details, see Real Decreto-ley 8/2020 of March 17 (BOE 73)
16 Contract expiration takes into account the time added because of the duration of an ERTE. The right to
reduced hours for workers with family care needs is also reinforced.
17 See Real Decreto-ley 7/2020 of March 12 (BOE 65).
18 The labor Force Survey (EPA) in Spain is conducted in such a way that we cannot identify the week that
interviews take place within a quarter.
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economic measures to support workers affected by the lockdown (which happened a
few days after the lockdown was declared). It all happened between the end of the
first quarter of the year 2020 and the second. While the impact in the second quarter is
very clear-cut, the first quarter was a period of uncertainty driven by the expectation
of the government that the pandemic was not going to severely hit the population and
the economy.19
Overall, the economic impact ofCOVID inSpain has been threefold. First, the direct
impact is due to sick leave and mortality of infected people. Second, the economic
effects are due to restrictions on economic activities. As mentioned above, prominent
among these the brake on all non-essential economic activity20 during the lockdown,
mostly in the second quarter of 2020; and later, the much more partial brake on
economic activity during the second state of alarm from the fourth quarter of 2020
onward. Restrictions on international tourism, also in origin countries of tourists,
and more generally behavioral responses of economic agents to COVID, have had
a further significant impact beyond the states of alarm themselves. Third, economic
policy measures have been instituted to counteract the adverse impacts of COVID
and associated restrictions, among these, importantly, the extraordinary flexibility
measures such as the ERTEs (which are ongoing beyond the first quarter of 2021) and
the banning of economic dismissals in the second quarter of 2020.
3 Trends and cycles of the dual labor market
First, we study the trend behavior of aggregate hours, employment, and hours per
worker separately for perms and temps since the late 1980s to themost recent available
data in 2021 (Sect. 3.1). Second, we look into the cyclical behavior of the Spanish labor
market focusing on the twomost recent recessions including the financial crisis in 2008
and the COVID-19 crisis and provide a discussion on the role of the ERTEs in this
context (Sect. 3.2). Third, we conduct a cross-industry analysis over time (Sect. 6.1).
3.1 Three-decade trends
We show the time series of aggregate (weekly) hours and its components for the total
economy as well as separately for perms and temps in Spain 1987Q2 to 2021Q1 in
Fig. 2. Focusing on the trend behavior of aggregate hours per working-age individual,
we find a substantial increase over the past three decades. Precisely, aggregate hours
per working-age adult are 11.7 in 1987Q2 increasing to 17.6 in 2019Q1; see panel
(a) in Fig. 2. Aggregate hours are normalized by working-age population (16+) and
reported per week. We keep this normalization throughout the entire paper.
19 Recently, Aleman et al. (2020) estimate the effectiveness of the national lockdown in Spain and argue
that the lockdown came with a substantial delay in terms of lives saved. The delayed government response
was not unique to Spain. Most European countries had a delayed response to the crisis, most notably the
UK.
20 The full list of essential industries can be found in the text of the Real Decreto-ley 10/2020, from 29





Fig. 2 Hours and employment: total, perms, and temps, Spain 1987Q2–2021Q1. Notes: Aggregate hours
and employment are divided by working age population. All variables are reported on a weekly basis. The
vertical dashed lines correspond to the quarters in which the EPA survey was re-designed as described in
the text
The largest part of these three-decade increase in the total economy aggregate
hours—approximately two-thirds—is accounted for by the perms. In 1987, aggre-
gate permanent hours, i.e., the sum of all hours by permanent workers normalized
by working-age population, were 9.9 hours rising to 13.0 in 2019. The aggregate
temporary hours have increased from 2.3 in 1987 to 3.8 in 2019, though in a clear
non-monotonic fashion. To be clear, both total permanent and temporary hours are
normalized by the same denominator (total working-age population) and hence are
additive component of overall aggregate hours in the previous paragraph.21
The peak for the entire time series of aggregate hours is reached right before the
Great Recession: 18.0 for the total economy-wide hours (2007Q1), 12.7 for perm
hours (2008Q2), and 6.0 for temp hours (2007Q1). Further, note that aggregate hours
in 2019, before the COVID-19 Recession—have not yet recovered their pre-Great
21 The working-age population does not adjust for those who are out of the labor force due to education,
sickness, early retirement, etc.
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Recession levels in the total economy, with a sizeable gap (relative to the pre-Great
Recession peak) in total temp hours persisting more than a decade later.
The trend behavior of aggregate hours is largely explained by employment; see
panel (b) in Fig. 2. We again normalize employment by the working-age popula-
tion. Employment, as a proportion of the working-age population, has dramatically
increased from 34 percent in 1987 to 56 percent in 2019—with a peak close to that
figure before the Great Recession. The patterns of employment for perms and temps
largely mirror the patterns of their respective aggregate hours. In particular, the three-
decade increase in employment in the total economy largely originates in the perms.
In contrast to the behavior of aggregate hours and employment, hours per employed
worker (often abbreviated as “hours per worker”) are remarkably constant over the
past three decades fluctuating around 33; see panel (c) in Fig. 2. Perms show similar
weekly hours per worker to those of the total economy throughout, slightly larger
from the early 2000s. On the contrary, temps show a more pronounced decline from
an average of 33 weekly hours per worker in the early 1990s to 29 weekly hours per
worker in the late 2010s. The decrease in the temps’ weekly hours per worker occurs
from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s after which the temps’ weekly hours per worker
remain relatively steady around 29 weekly hours until the COVID-19 Recession.
In terms of the share of aggregate hours by temps and perms, total temp hours
account for an average of 28 percent of aggregate hours over the entire period, growing
from less than 20 percent in the late 1980s to levels above 30 percent through the 1990s,
after which temps account for approximately 25 percent of aggregate hours since the
aftermath of the Great Recession; see panel (d) in Fig. 2. The share of employment by
temps is similar to that of aggregate hours except for a slight larger drop in the share
of aggregate hours since the early 2000s.
Aggregate hours in Fig. 2 show large fluctuations since the late 1980s. In partic-
ular, although the years prior to the Great Recession and the most recent COVID-19
Recession aggregate hours increase in relatively steady manner, aggregate hours sub-
stantially decline during both recessions, but with very different underlying dynamics,
which we address in more detail next.
3.2 The Great Recession and COVID-19
Here, we assess the effects of a recession on aggregate hours and its components
separately for perms and temps. For this end, we compute the absolute deviations
between the actual value of a variable of interest during a recession and an empirical
“counterfactual” that captures the value that the variable of interest would attain had
the recession not occurred. To construct this “counterfactual,” we project the predicted
values of a pre-recession deseasonalized trend (of a variable of interest) onto the
recession quarters.
That is, for our purposes, the difference between the actual data during the recession
and the projection of a pre-recession (deseasonalized) trend onto the recession quarters
captures the effects of the recession, as, e.g., in Eyméoud et al. (2021b). Note that the
empirical “counterfactual” (i.e., the predicted value) is a projection from an estimation
that uses strictly only pre-recession data. Precisely, for quarters t < tR , where tR is the
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quarter where a recession starts, we estimate the pre-recession deseasonalized trend
as:
xt = cons. + γ t + δQ1t + et , (1)
with xt = {Ht , et , ht }. There is an time trend captured by γ and a seasonal component
captured by the quarterly dummy coefficients δQ . Then, we construct the predicted
values x̂t = ĉons. + γ̂ t +̂δQ1t for all periods including their projection for t ≥ tR
onto the recession quarters. The difference between the predicted value x̂t (including
its projection onto the recession quarters) and the actual value xt , i.e., t = x̂t − xt ,
is what we plot in Fig. 3. Note that we conduct this exercise separately by recession.
Specifically, we use an onset of the recession, tR , equal to 2008Q1 for the Great
Recession and equal to 2020Q1 for the COVID-19 Recession. In each recession, we
use the several quarters before tR to estimate (1) spanning from 2005Q1 to 2007Q4
for the Great Recession and from 2013Q1 to 2019Q4 for the COVID-19 Recession.
Our results are in Fig. 3 separately for aggregate hours and its components: employ-
ment and hours per worker. The analysis is decomposed across perms and temps.
Further, to ease the comparison between the response across the two recessions we
shift the time of the onset of the COVID-19 Recession (see dashed vertical line) in
order to make it coincide with the onset of the Great Recession; see Fig. 3. In this
manner, our strategy to compare the dynamic (IRF-like) responses of the labor market
across recessions resembles an event study—indeed, before the start of each reces-
sion, we show that the deviations from trend of the labor market variables are similar
across recessions. Unfortunately, as we discussed earlier, the combination of over-
lapping policies that are put forward in response to COVID-19 makes it challenging
to attribute the differential response across recessions to a specific policy. Neverthe-
less, as a first attempt to assessing the role of ERTEs we also reconduct our analysis
by dropping the individuals with ERTEs from our sample of employed individuals.
This analysis helps us gain insights on the role of ERTEs in preventing the loss of
employment and in generating the drop of hours per worker during the COVID-19
Recession.
Aggregate hours We find that during the COVID-19, there is a loss of 4 aggregate
hours (per working-age individual) in the second quarter of the recession, 2020Q2;
see left column in panel (a) in Fig. 3. This implies a massive deviation of aggregate
hours of approximately 30 percent below trend in 2020Q2. In contrast, the effects that
we observe in the Great Recession are slower and initially milder than in the COVID-
19 Recession. In particular, three quarters into the Great Recession we find a loss
of 2 aggregate hours—i.e., half of the total drop observed during the second quarter
into the COVID-19 Recession. With the end of the lockdown, the Spanish economy
starts to partially in 2020Q3 reducing the loss of aggregate hours below trend, and
in 2020Q1, the aggregate hours loss coincides with that of the Great Recession in
2009Q1, a response that builds up slower.
Interestingly, by splitting the sample between perms and temps we find that these
components of the behavior of aggregate hours substantially differ across recessions.




Total Economy Permanent Temporary
(b) Employment
Total Economy Permanent Temporary
(c) Hours per Worker
Total Economy Permanent Temporary
Fig. 3 Response of the dual labor market, absolute deviations: Great Recession and COVID-19. Notes:
All variables are plotted as level deviations from a predicted trend from 1 that uses data up to the onset of
recessions. Aggregate hours (H ) and employment (e) are divided by the working age population. Aggregate
hours and hours per worker (h) are expressed in a weekly basis. Note that we have shifted the Covid-19
Recession in time in order to normalize the onset of the Covid-19 Recession (solid orange line) to that of the
Great Recession (solid blue line). The vertical dashed line denotes the normalized onset of both recessions.
We also add a alternative "No ERTE" path where we drop individuals with ERTEs from the employment
series (dashed yellow line) (color figure online)
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hours is driven by perms, who experience a drop of 2.5 aggregate hours (again in
“per working-age individual” units); see the center column in panel (a) in Fig. 3. The
remaining 40 percent is due to temps, whose aggregate hours drop by 1.5; see the
right column in panel (a) in Fig. 3. During the subsequent quarters, working hours for
temporary and permanent recover only partially, i.e., are still substantially below the
pre-COVID trend.
In this manner, the labor market response of the COVID-19 Recession shows a
behavior that contrasts strongly with previous downturns. For example, during the
Great Recession total permanent hours were not affected one year into the recession;
there, the drop in total temporary hours is almost entirely responsible for the decline
in the whole economy. Differently, the response of aggregate hours is more symmetric
in the COVID-19 Recession than what it was in the Great Recession; if anything, the
COVID-19 Recession shows a larger loss for perms than for temps one year into the
recession, in sharp contrast to previous downturns.
Employment The employment losses during COVID-19 and the Great Recession are
in panel (b) in Fig. 3. During the second quarter of the COVID-19 Recession, we find
a drop of approximately 6 percentage points of employment (relative to the working-
age population). This implies a drop of approximately 10% in percentage deviation
from trend employment; panel (b) in Fig. 4. The Great Recession shows a ballpark
similar drop in terms of employment in the first year, accumulated at a slower pace,
but persistently so; see the left column of panel (b) in Fig. 3. Separately inspecting the
employment behavior of perms and temps across recessions, we observe a larger loss
of permanent employment levels in the COVID Recession than in the Great Recession
one year into the recession; see, respectively, the center and right columns of panel
(b) in Fig. 3. This larger loss of perm employment during COVID-19 than during the
Great Recession persists at least up to our last observation—i.e., five quarters into the
recession. In contrast, the loss of employment in temporary contracts—while larger
than the contemporaneous loss in permanent contracts—is smaller during COVID-
19 than in the Great Recession, except for the deep drop in 2020Q2, which shows an
employment loss of 0.03 as opposed to the loss of 0.02 in the analogous 2008Q2 of the
Great Recession. Then, three quarters into the recession, the loss of temp employment
in the economy is about similar in both recession. Finally, four quarters (and further)
into the recession the loss of temp employment during COVID-19 is smaller than that
of the Great Recession. Interestingly, even though the loss in employment in the total
economy is still mostly accounted by temps in 2020Q3 (approximately two-thirds
of the total drop in employment), there is a tendency to symmetry, and by 2021Q1,
perm and temps almost split their contribution to the total employment loss in half.
Hence, not only the employment loss is smaller during COVID-19 than in the Great
Recession, but also it seems it becomes more symmetric over time across temps and
perms in the COVID-19 than one year into the Great Recession.
Hours per worker The behavior of (weekly) hours per worker also differs greatly
across recessions; see panel (c) in Fig. 3. Whereas hours per worker do not respond
in a significant manner during the Great Recession, hours per worker largely drop by
6.5 in 2020Q2—a 20 percent reduction below trend—during COVID-19 and seem




Total Economy Permanent Temporary
(b) Employment
Total Economy Permanent Temporary
(c) Hours per Worker
Total Economy Permanent Temporary
Fig. 4 Response of the dual labor market, relative (%) deviations: Great Recession and COVID-19. Notes:
All variables are plotted as relative (%) deviations from a predicted trend from 1 that uses data up to the
onset of recessions. Aggregate hours (H ) and employment (e) are divided by the working age population.
Aggregate hours and hours per worker (h) are expressed in a weekly basis. Note that we have shifted the
Covid-19 Recession in time in order to normalize the onset of the Covid-19 Recession (solid orange line)
to that of the Great Recession (solid blue line). The vertical dashed line denotes the normalized onset of
both recessions. We also add a alternative "No ERTE" path where we drop individuals with ERTEs from
the employment series (dashed yellow line) (color figure online)
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hours per permanent worker is a little over 7 hours and by temporary workers a little
less than 5.5 hours. Subsequently, hours per worker recover less for permanent than
temporary workers at a respective loss of 2.5 and 1 in 2021Q1. O
Overall, even though the employment loss for the total economy in 2021Q1 is
approximately sixty percent lower than that of Great Recession at the same stage of the
recession—i.e., one year into the recession, the large drop in hours per worker during
COVID-19– makes the behavior of total aggregate hours across the two recessions
extraordinarily similar—after the initial COVID-19 shock. Isolating the effects of
perms and temps, we find substantial differences across recessions. During the first
stages of the Great Recession (2008Q1-2009Q1), the loss of aggregate hours is almost
entirely accounted for a by a loss of temp employment. In contrast, during COVID-19
and for stage of the recession (2020Q1–2021Q1), the loss of aggregate hours is a
composite of losses from perms and temps. Although it is temps that suffer the largest
losses in employment—accounting for two-thirds of the total losses in 2020Q1, perms
account for one-third of the employment losses. These employment losses become
more symmetric over time up to point where in 2021Q1 the contribution of the loss
in employment in the total economy is almost equally explained by perms and temps.
Further, the COVID-19 response comes with a higher adjustment in hours per worker
for the perms, relative to the temps. This implies that overall, the effect of the recession
in terms of aggregate hours is actually larger for perms than for temps throughout the
currently observable quarters of the COVID-19 Recession though with a tendency to
more symmetry over time.
3.3 The role of ERTEs: an exploratory analysis
Although we cannot pinpoint the specific origins of the large differences between the
labor market behavior during COVID-19 and the Great Recession that we document,
it is reasonable to suspect that ERTEs may have had impact. However, identifying the
isolated effects of ERTEs is problematic given the package of alternative policy mea-
sures that was implemented almost simultaneously; see our discussion in Sect. 2.3. In
this context, in order to explore the potential role of the ERTEs, we simply re-conduct
our analysis removing from our sample of employed individuals the population that
reports being under ERTEs.22 Clearly, this experiment is not identical to a counterfac-
tual scenario that shows the behavior of the Spanish labor market had the ERTEs not
been implemented. The reason is that we do not know whether the individuals with
ERTEs would have lost their job without the implementation of the ERTEs. Hence,
our experiment simply contributes to highlight the differential employment (and hours
per worker) of the actual economy (benchmark sample) with ERTEs versus an alterna-
tive view of the same economy where the individuals under ERTE are not considered
22 This information is taken from a variable in the EPA that records the “Reason for not having worked in
the reference week, if employed”. One of the answers is being subject to ERTE, and that is what we count
as furloughed workers: those classified as employed (either perms or temps) that reported no hours and
cited as the reason an ERTE. There is also a partial ERTE question (so workers do work but less hours than




employed (i.e., a restricted sample that excludes individuals with ERTEs from the
employed population).
Our results are in Fig. 3. The differences between the behavior of employment in our
benchmark sample with ERTEs (solid orange line) and our restricted sample without
ERTEs (dashed yellow line) are substantial. In terms of employment, if we do not count
ERTEs as employment, the economy suffers approximately twice the employment
losses in 2020Q2; see panel (b) in Fig. 3. Further, decomposing the effects of ERTEs
into perms and temps, we find that the ERTEs have largely cushioned permanent
employment. Precisely, the loss of employment for perm workers is more than three
times larger for the samplewithout ERTEs than for the benchmark samplewith ERTEs.
The ERTEs also helped cushion temp employment, but to amuch lesser extent. Indeed,
for the sample economy without ERTEs the employment losses are larger for the
perms (more than 6 percentage points relative to the working-age population), than
the losses for the temps (approximately 5 percentage points relative to the working-age
population).
In terms of hours per worker, note that employed individuals with an ERTE report
zero hours of work. Further, recall that hours per worker are computed as the ratio
between aggregate hours and employment. Hence, ERTEs can be a (mechanic) ratio-
nale for the observed drop in hours per worker as the individuals with ERTEs reduce
aggregate hours (numerator) without reducing employment (denominator) since indi-
viduals with ERTEs while reporting zero hours remain officially employed. We can
assess this hypothesis by constructing hours per worker for our restricted sample that
does not consider individuals with ERTEs employed. We find that even for the part of
the employed economy that is not subject to ERTEs, hours per worker drop; see panel
(c) in Fig. 3. Indeed, the drop in hours per worker for this restricted sample accounts
for approximately half of the total drop in hours per worker. That is, the ERTEs help
explain the drop in hours per worker, but half of that drop is still unaccounted for. This
insights on hours per worker apply for both the perms and the temps with a stronger
drop—also without ERTEs—for the perms.
Therefore, our analysis shows that, in addition to preventing employment losses,
the ERTEs help explain the drop in hours per worker. At the same time, our analysis
shows that although the ERTEs help reduce employment losses, they do not fully
mitigate them. That is, the ERTEs do not sustain a story whereby—without employ-
ment losses—the sole margin of adjustment is hours per worker. In other words, the
adjustment in hours per worker is not the only differential aspect of the COVID-19
Recession with respect to the Great Recession. During COVID-19, perm workers suf-
fer large employment losses even with ERTEs. Further, the drop in hours per worker
cannot be fully attributed to ERTEs since hours per worker substantially drop for
individuals without ERTEs. Part of this drop in hours per worker that we document
for the sample economy without ERTEs—in both perms and temps—could be partly
explained by the 2012 reform that increased the ability to re-negotiate at the firm level
the collective sector-level agreements regarding hours which increased the flexibility
of hours per worker (Doménech et al. 2018). It is likely that the possibility to adjust
hours per worker for those individuals without ERTEs also prevented further employ-
ment losses in both perms and temps. In the Great Recession, which preceded the
2012 reform, it was harder for firms to adjust hours per worker. This implies that in
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order to reduce labor input, the economy had to endure employment losses during the
Great Recession, in particular for temps on the onset of the recession—a typical dual
labor market outcome. In contrast, during the COVID-19, we find employment losses
even for the perms. However, the duality of the labor market during COVID-19 is still
present in the same direction as in the Great Recession in the sense that temps show
approximately five times higher employment losses than perms in relative terms as
percentage deviations from their trends, respectively, a loss of 25% of employment for
temps and 5% for perms; see Fig. 4. Interestingly, we find that this duality result is in
large part sustained by the ERTEs since the restricted sample without ERTEs drops the
differential factor of employment losses between temps and temps from five to two.
Precisely, without ERTEs perms show a loss of employment of approximately 15%
below trend and temps show a loss of employment of approximately 30% in 2020Q2.
In terms of hours per worker, we find that with or without the ERTEs, the magnitudes
in the drop of hours across perms and temps are similar. In general, the effects of the
ERTEs are substantially reduced from 2020Q3 and onward.
3.4 An analysis of the joint dynamics of perms and temps hours
The differential response of both employment and hours per worker across recessions
that we document implies that focusing solely on employment to understand the labor
market behavior provides a partial view of the actual adjustment of the labor input.
With the benefit of hindsight, we now study more closely the behavior of aggregate
hours which encompasses both employment and hours per worker dynamics. In par-
ticular, we study the complete path of the dual labor market behavior in terms of
aggregate hours during the Great Recession and compare it with that of the ongoing
COVID-19 Recession.We focus on the separate response of aggregate hours by perms
and temps.23 In particular, to document the changing hours balance between perms
and temps we plot the ratio of the aggregate hours of temps to those of perms (vertical
axis) against the aggregate hours of perms (horizontal axis); see Fig. 5. In this man-
ner, a vertical movement means that temps’ aggregate hours bear the burden of the
adjustment (increasing if moving up, decreasing if moving down), while a horizontal
movement means the adjustment is equally shared among the two types of workers.
Hence, if permanentworkers are the only ones adjusting, then there is a diagonalmove-
ment northwest (if perms’ hours decrease) or southeast (if perms’ hours increase). A
diagonal southwest move indicates that both perms and temps adjust downward, but
temps are disproportionately affected. Finally, a northeast move would indicate both
perm and temp hours increase, but the hours increase relatively more for temporary
workers. We conduct this exercise by industry.
The Great Recession: a J -pattern and clockwise loop First, early in the Great
Recession—approximately the first six quarters that follow 2008Q1, we find that the
ratio of temp hours to perm hours declines noticeably for the private sector; see panel
(a) in Fig. 5. This occurs at the same time that perm hours adjust much more slowly.
The combination of these two phenomena shows a relatively steep fall in our scatter
23 As per our discussion in Sect. 3.2, the response of aggregate hours summarizes the joint response of















































7 8 9 10
Total 'Permanent' Hours
Fig. 5 Joint dynamics of temp and perm hours. Notes: We use aggregate hours of perms and temps in
the private sector. Our measure of aggregate hours is normalized by the working age population and are
interpreted as the number of weekly hours devoted to production, per working-age person in Spain. To
improve the visualization, we have slightly smoothed the evolution of the temps to perms ratio, up to
2019Q4; to fully capture the dynamics in the Covid-19 Recession, we have left these without smoothing.
The quarters in the pre-2008 recession era are marked in blue, the twin recessions of the Great Recession in
thicker red (the short intervening period in orange), the post-Great Recession recovery in green and Covid-
19 in thicker black. We exclude construction from the private sector, and conduct a by industry analysis in
Sect. 6.1 (color figure online)
plot (thicker red line after thin blue line), which implies that most of the adjustment
comes from temp hours early in the Great Recession; see also Sect. 3.2. Beyond this,
in the second part of the Great Recession (from 2010 to 2013Q2)—a period that
concatenates the 2008 financial crisis with the European sovereign debt crisis, we find
that the decline in the temp-to-perm hours ratio slows down, while permanent hours
drop throughout which flips themargin of adjustment from temps to perms. As a result,
we find a J -pattern (or L-pattern) for the Great Recession in Spain from 2008 to 2014
in the private sector.
Then, in the initial phases of the recovery—from 2013 to 2016—we see a response
(green line segment) that generally lies above that of the Great Recession; see panel (a)
in Fig. 5. As hours increase in a recovering sector, the ratio of temporary to permanent
hours grows: Aggregate hours increase by utilizing relatively more hours from temps.
Moreover, for most market sectors, in panels (b)–(e), the ratio of temp to perm hours
is larger in the recovery, for each level of perm hours, than it was in the recession
before. This implies that the evolution of temp hours and perm hours during the Great
Recession and its recovery—i.e., piecing together the red and green lines in Fig. 5—is
well summarized by a clockwise loop, clearly recognizable in the private industries.
COVID-19 Recession The initial response up to (and including) the second quarter
of 2020 is a sharp leftward and somewhat less strong downward move; see black line
panel (a) in Fig. 5. That is, initially, the COVID-19 Recession implies a massive loss
of permanent hours which is accompanied by a more moderate decline in the ratio of
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temp to perm hours. This is consistent with our previous results—indeed temp hours
drop by a lesser magnitude than perm hours with respect to their associated trends;
see Sect. 3.2. Further, note that the change in permanent hours in 2020Q2 alone is
larger than the entire drop in permanent hours during the Great Recession. Indeed, in
the private sector, permanent hours in 2020Q2 mark a twenty-first century lowest. At
the same time, the drop in the ratio of temp to perm hours is clearly visible between
2020Q1 and 2020Q2, but smaller than the total drop of this ratio through the entire
Great Recession.
Clearly, the COVID-19 Recession contrasts greatly with what occurred early in the
Great Recession where the margin of adjustment was initially (almost exclusively)
born by temps. This is shared across most sectors; see panels (b)–(e) in Fig. 5. We
see that the response for Hospitality, Retail, and Transport (HRT), as expected, is
the strongest of all sectors in the COVID Recession; the construction sector on the
other hand responds more weakly than it did in the Great Recession. Interestingly, in
many sectors, the angle of black line covering the initial impact of COVID retraces
the direction travelled during the post-2013 recovery closely (i.e., crossing the green
curve somewhere around 2013 but, of course, extending further to the bottom right).
Finally, note that the partial recovery in the third quarter of 2020 comes with a sharp
right-ward, near-flat move across almost all sectors: A substantial part of the earlier
loss of permanent hours is recovered, but not completely, while the temp-to-perm hour
ratio also does not fully recover. In particular, it does not appear to be the case that the
end of the lockdown has necessarily set the response in the temp to perm ratio relative
to permanent hours neither back to the start in 2019Q4, nor put it on a similar dynamic
track as occurred the Great Recession, with dominant total temp hours losses. After
the lockdown ended, still relatively more use is being made of the permanent margin
than at the beginning of the recession before, and that this shared by many sectors.
The partial recovery after the lockdown, nevertheless, leaves space that, if, e.g., the
ERTEs were to be phased out, the economy could return to a point that effectively lies
on a “Great Recession”-like J -shaped curve in Fig. 5 originating from the 2019Q4
data point.
4 A productionmodel with temp and perm hours
In this section, we lay out a model that can give rise to the above clockwise adjustment
pattern in the simplest way possible, and use it as a device to discuss the patterns in
Fig. 5 for both the Great Recession and the COVID Recession. By construction, this
model abstracts from many dynamic considerations—as such it cannot capture the
full richness of distortions associated with duality in the labor market. However, it
(re)emphasizes elements present already, e.g., in Dolado et al. (2002) that are relevant
in light of the above analysis, and argues these should be taken seriously in further
dynamic investigations. We discuss this further at the end of this section.
Consider a constant elasticity of substitution production function that relies on the
















where σ is the elasticity of substitution between permanent workers and temps and
ηT , ηP are weights that allow us to match the shares of temporary hours vs permanent
hours in production.Define p = P A, so thatwe can capture both shocks to P (demand)
and A (technology) in one variable.25
Fix hourly wages for temps, wT , and perms, wP . Workers are hired competitively
and employed in a representative firm with production function (2), while capital
K is fixed throughout the analysis. We consider only a one-period static decision
making, with prices taken as given. To build our argument, we introduce one friction:
Firms, however, have inherited a stock of temporary and permanent workers and face
a firing cost on the permanent workers. As in panel (c) in Fig. 2, we see that in the
Great Recession an hours reduction implies an employment reduction (as hours per
worker are approximately constant); we therefore phrase the firing cost as cost per
unit reduction τ of HP from H0P .
26












σ−1 − wT HT − wP (HP + τ max{H0P − HP , 0}).
(3)
The associated first-order condition with respect to HT equals












σ−1 · H−αP . (4)
The actual choice of HT depends on whether and how permanent hours HP adjust as
well, which we cover in the next result:
Result 1 Given H0P , there exists a unique p, p, with p(H
0
P ) = p ≤ p(H0P )
24 Note that adding capital as complement to the labor composite in brackets in (2) does not change our
analysis since we are going to be interested in the parameter σ that is pinned down by the relative wages
and relative labor inputs of permanent workers and temps.
25 Note that while firms face a static trade-off between the two types of labor here, this can be thought
to capture (though in very reduced form) some of the firms’ dynamic portfolio choice regarding a stable
“permanent” workforce (which, e.g., can acquire skills with firm tenure to perform tasks better) and a
“temporary” workforce (which provides flexibility in response to shocks), with parameter σ capturing how
easily this portfolio can be varied.
26 Thus, implicitly in modeling the Great Recession, we assume that hours reduction comes mainly in the
form of employment (i.e., number of workers) reduction, costly in case of permanent workers and not so
in case of temporary workers. In discussing COVID times subsequently, we consider the same dimension,
hours, but now it can adjustedwithout necessary dismissals andwithout differential costs for the permanents.
For temporary workers, hours adjustment can be either in the form of an ERTE-hours adjustment per worker
or a dismissal—in reality both margins have been used (as also visible in Sect. 3).
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We can calculate that
p(H0P ) = (H0P )α ·
wP (1 − τ)
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and it follows that for τ > 0, it holds that p(H0P ) < p(H
0
P ), for any σ ≥ 0 (given
0 < α < 1).
3. for any p(H0P ) ≤ p ≤ p(H0P ), HP = H0P and HT satisfies first-order condition
(4) and
(











With Result 1 in hand, it is easy to characterize what will happen when p declines
substantially then recovers, in a sequence of repeated instances of the above static
problem, without intertemporal links in the objective function, other than through the
evolution of H0P . One interpretation of the exercise would be profit maximization by
extremely myopic firms. Thus, the representative firm would, given wages, maximize
inputs HT and HP , where the latter becomes the next period’s H0P .
Given this, we can work toward characterizing the dynamics, as a sequence of
static maximizations, given evolving p and H0P . First, note that p(H
0
P ) and p(H
0
P )
are concave functions of H0P , as in the left panel of Fig. 6. Suppose that we start at the
purple x, and the economy will enter in recession (p decreases). At first as p drops,
we are in the third case of result 1: Temporary workers are shed, and HT /H0P drops



















Fig. 6 Evolution of productivity/demand p, perm hours HP , and temp-to-perm hours ratio HT /HP




Fig. 6, this means a move down along the p in the left panel, and a horizontal move
in the right panel. When the recovery starts and p starts to increase again, at first it
is strictly better to hire only temporary workers. The marginal product of temporary
workers has gone up, at the previous period’s level of HT and HP ; however, not so
many temps have been hired yet that the MRS (M P LT /M P L P ) has gone down to
relative wage ratio wT
wP
, where increasing permanent hours would become beneficial.
(Subscript T points to the temporary hour wage and MPL, P to the permanent hour
analogues.) As long as p rises, but stays in the range associated with case 3 in result
1, H0P stays constant. Finally, when p is hit, an increase in p, triggers an increase in
H0P , to keep HT /HP at HT /HP .
Thus, firing costs in this extremely simple and intuitive setting, gives rather straight-
forwardly rise to clockwise loops, as we saw it in the data. In contrast, ERTEs
allow costless adjustment in both permanent and temporary hours: A corresponding
case in our simple theory would be the firing cost for permanent workers drop-
ping to zero. Then the area of the clockwise loop will collapse, and adjustment
will take place according to (7) and (8), with the latter yielding HP according to













. Thus, a reduction in produc-
tion following a negative shock to p will now follow the upper curve, not the lower
curve, in Fig. 6 and re-trace any previous expansion (when p was previously growing),
consistent with the retracing we observe in the COVID-19 Recession part of Fig. 5
in the previous section.27 A renewed recovery in p would once again trace out this
curve.28
27 Though, of course, it must be said that the pattern is richer in the data, where retracing involves not only
changes in HP but also the changing HT /HP ratio.
28 The observation that, in the data, the recovery in the third quarter of 2020 is associated with a flatter slope
from 2020Q2 to 2020Q3 in Fig. 5 than from 2020Q1 to 2020Q2 is not necessarily contradictory with this
mechanism per se: In the data adjustment did not exclusively happen through ERTE, but to a lesser extent
through employment reductions, with the former force also of some relevance in 2020Q2, as Fig. 3 shows.
With the adjustment of ERTEs changing hours in 2020Q3 more dominant than employment changing in
2020Q3, the subsequent adjustment of HP with less effect on HT /HP is then also more in line with the
model, i.e., recovery with a flatter line in (HP , HT /HP )-space.
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Of course, the above discussion uses a simple model to intuitively illustrate the
economic mechanism behind the data patterns in Sect. 6.1. A more in-depth investiga-
tion could incorporate this in a state-of-the-art properly dynamic equilibrium model.
29 A fully dynamic model could incorporate the opportunity-cost motive along the
lines that we mentioned in the previous section: In a declining industry, a permanent
worker who is not fired todaymay very well be fired tomorrow (with the firm incurring
the firing cost in any case, though possibly discounted). More generally, firms face an
intertemporal trade-off between having a stable workforce (that allows investment in
potentially specialized human capital, and less hiring costs) and adjustment flexibility
to negative shocks that we have clearly abstracted from.30
Note further that wages have been held constant throughout this exercise. As such,
it appears difficult to use the clockwise loop patterns by themselves to estimate the
elasticity of substitution between permanent and temporary hours in production.While
the difference between p(H0P ) and p(H
0
P ) responds to σ and τ , the extent of p changes
affects how much the HP moves horizontally. Let alone, that any additional hetero-
geneity (e.g., as mentioned in footnote 29) also shapes the loop. Again, this points to
the need for fully specified, dynamic models of the labor market [building, e.g., on
Bentolila et al. (2012a), among others] to help understand fully the dual labor market
over the cycle.
5 Discussion
Thus, in the previous section, we have discussed that a simplemodel with an integrated
production of temporary and permanent workers and costly firing of permanent work-
ers can intuitively capture the clockwise dynamics that we documented for the Great
Recession and its recovery in Sect. 3. Further, as we also documented, the initial drop
in temp hours with relatively little change in perm hours in the Great Recession does
not apply to the COVID-19 so far; instead, there is an immediate strong adjustment
of permanent hours. Again, the simple model, now with costless adjustment of labor,
can help provide a rationalization for this.
Large adjustments across recessions and their implicationsThe flexibility to adjust
hours, inherent to ERTE/short-time work policy, could help to distribute the impact
of the COVID shock across the labor market, not just the parts where temporary
employment dominates. The nature of ERTEs across both temporary and open-ended
contracts suggests a possible direction in which adjustment would occur without firing
restrictions.We can see a suggestive relation for this whenwe put the “deviation-from-
29 The model could otherwise be generalized to smooth out the angular L-shape in Fig. 6. Intuitively,
heterogeneous firing cost across workers, or a probability that some permanent workers would have to be
dismissed at the end of the period in any case (lowering the opportunity cost of immediate dismissal) could
help with this.
30 Some of this ‘dynamic’ imperfect substitutability of both types of labor could be thought as captured
reduced form by the complementarity parameter in the production function. Modeling this explicitly, how-
ever, could widen the scope of the model, to address question regarding ERTEs/short-time work and labor
misallocation. We thank a referee for pointing this out.
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Fig. 7 Hours and employment deviations from pre-recession trends: temps and perms
trend”measurement of Sect. 3.2, together with the subsequent analysis in Sects. 6.1–4,
in the form of two graphs.
In Fig. 7, we plot a smoothed version of the total economy hours deviation from the
pre-recession trend on the x-axis and set it against the deviations of total, temporary,
and permanent hours, for both recessions in Fig. 7a and employment in Fig. 7b. For
the lighter (more transparent) lines corresponding to the Great Recession, each quarter
these gaps relative to previous trend increased, so a rightwardmovement alongmarkers
also corresponds to the quarterly evolution of the variables in question. 31 For the
COVID Recession, we have labeled the quarters, starting by 2020Q2 at the very right
31 Hours are once again normalized by the entire working-age population. As before, one hour on this
graph corresponds to one hour per week of the representative working-age person.
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(the biggest hours response), followed by a leftward move in 2020Q3, and ultimately
a much smaller rightward move in 2021Q1.
Figure 7a illustrates that, in terms of accumulated deviation from pre-recession
trend, the Great Recession, at the trough in 2013, had a loss in aggregate hours not
too different from the second quarter in 2020 deviation (relative to the pre-2020 trend,
here calculated from 2015withminor impact). As our discussion in Sect. 6.1 indicates,
the evolution of the relative importance of permanent vs temporary hours loss clearly
contrasts between the two recessions. At the beginning of the Great Recession, more
than two-thirds of the losses were borne by temporary workers, with the relative
importance of temporary vs. permanent hours reduction only switching 1.5 year into
the Great Recession—very different from the pattern in the first quarters of the COVID
Recession. Only at the end of the Great Recession, after the permanent losses in the
later years of it, the relative division of the losses between permanent and temporary
hours has become roughly similar, though (even with the larger aggregate hours loss)
the ratio is still larger from peak to trough of the Great Recession.
Figure 7b then compares the reduction (deviation from trend) in temporary and
permanent employment, on the y-axis, to the aggregate hours deviation, again on the
x-axis. For the Great Recession, we see that the reduction in workers follows closely
the shape of the hours pattern over time. The reduction in employment during the
COVID Recession is much less in comparison given the enormous amount of hours
reduction. Note that even though the level of temporary employment losses is higher
than permanent losses in COVID times, it lies strictly below its corresponding curve
for the Great Recession, leaving suggestive room for ERTEs to keep some temporary
employment going that in its absence would have been destroyed. Relative to the
aggregate hours loss, the destruction of permanent employment in 2020Q2 has been
much less than accumulated in the Great Recession. With the partial recovery of the
economy in the next two quarters (2020Q3-Q4), the loss of permanent employment
in 2020Q4 remains below or equal to curve of the Great Recession, while in 2021Q1
aggregate hours drop without additional meaningful adverse effects on permanent (or
for that matter, temporary) employment.
While the temp and perm employment losses are low relative to the aggregate hours
lost in the economy, they are large in the first all-recession quarter, 2020Q2, when
compared to the first quarters of the Great Recession (a very different comparison,
mostly covered in Fig. 3). The relative size of temporary and permanent employment
losses early in COVID times has a ballpark ratio of around 2-to-1 that mimics the ratio
early in the Great Recession (when aggregate hours losses were up to 1.5-2 hours).32
After the lockdown ended, the hours losses diminished, and employment losses relative
to aggregate hours losses became more in line the corresponding patterns the Great
Recession (i.e.,with less distance between theCOVID-Recession andGreat-Recession
data points corresponding to aggregate hours losses around 2), it remains noteworthy
that temporary employment losses are relatively lower (with a noticeable gap) in the
COVID Recession than in the Great Recession for similar levels of aggregate hours
losses.
32 As a result, it is hard to tell from this figure if there could have been an effect of the 2012 labor market
reform on the propensity for permanent dismissal in COVID times.
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Figure 7 leaves room for the multiple dimensions of the ERTE/short-time work
policy. By construction, this policy will help avoid dismissals of workers in permanent
and temporary contracts, an avoidance that can be rationalized by the nature of the
COVID shock. However, the impact of the policy can go beyond this: With its strength
depending on the elasticity of substitution σ , it allows a less distorted reduction in
employment and hours, which (by virtue of being closer to the unconstrained choice)
further could save viable production overall, relative to what would have been in the
absence of ERTEs. Indeed, the use of ERTEs allows firms to bypass the effective ‘tax’
wedge in adjustment of the two types of labor, and could lead to lower misallocation
at time of a serious negative shock.33 More generally, with firing costs distorting the
type of workers that are hired and dismissed, thereby distorting average productivity,
this points to a further discussion (outside the scope of this paper) on the benefits of
introducing permanent short-time work regulation, beyond the COVID-19 Recession.
6 Robustness and further context
First, we explore the robustness of some our empirical results. In particular, we focus
on the behavior of aggregate hours across industries in Sect. 6.1. Second, we briefly
explore two further dimensions by which the Great Recession and the COVID-19
Recession differ including business closures (and formation) in Sect. 6.2 and parental
labor supply in Sect. 6.3.
6.1 A cross-industry analysis
An aspect that reveals that Great Recession and the COVID-19 Recession are different
in nature is the fact that each recession affected different industries more than others.
Here, we explore how the heterogeneous response across industries differs by industry.
First, we reconduct our empirical analysis in Sect. 3.2 by industry; see Fig. 8. We do
this exercise to shed more light on the different nature of the two recessions. We focus
on employment, for simplicity. We find, as expected, that the impact of the COVID-
19 Recession was much more immediate and evident in all industries. In contrast, it
took time for many industries to be noticeably affected in the Great Recession, while
construction and real estate were immediately affected. That is, the Great Recession
was mainly driven by the collapse of construction and its related industries, while
the COVID-19 shock is more evenly shared. That being said, hospitality and retail
industries have suffered a much larger impact than other industries, with an employ-
ment loss of 2% of the working-age population in the second quarter of 2020 alone.
The effect of ERTEs is very unevenly split. We find that in 2020Q2, more than 27%
of individuals working in hospitality and retail were subject to an ERTE. This share
is much larger than any other industry—the second highest being manufactures of
final goods (retail) with 16.23%. In contrast, only 2.63% of employed workers were
33 Fully dynamic stochastic models can capture the trade-offs between firing flexibility, the benefits of
employment stability, and productive misallocation, by giving an explicit role to time and the environment
that changes with it (cf. the papers mentioned in Sect. 2.2).
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Fig. 8 Absolute response of employment by industry in the Great Recession and COVID-19. Notes: All
variables are plotted as level deviations from a predicted trend from 1 that uses data up to the onset of
recessions. The measuring and lines are equivalent from those in Fig. 3. We also annotate the percentage
of workers under an ERTE in 2020Q2 in each plot
under an ERTE in the public sector, and between 6% and 7% in the service industries
which are more amiable to remote working arrangements: communications and IT
and professional services. Finally, it is worth noting the similarity between the fall in
construction (without ERTEs) during 2020Q2 and that seen in the Great Recession.
Taken together with the large take-up of ERTEs in hospitality, this provides strong
evidence that these short-term work policies have had a large impact on employment.
More precisely, if remove the individuals with ERTEs from the employed population,
we find that across most industries the ERTEs cut the employment losses by approx-
imately by one half. At the same time, this implies that one half of the employment
losses remain unexplained. These results mimic the aggregate results discussed in
Sect. 3.3.
Second, we reconduct our analysis of the dual market hours by industry in order
to assess the robustness of the J -pattern (or L-pattern) that we documented for the
Great Recession in Spain from 2008 to 2014 in the private sector in Sect. 3.4. We find
that is also the case by industry, somewhat less pronounced in Manufacturing and in
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Fig. 9 Joint dynamics of temp and permhours: by industry.Notes: In panel (a),we exclude construction from
the private sector. Aggregate hours are normalized by the working age population and are interpreted as the
number of weekly hours devoted to production, per working-age person in Spain. To ease the visualization,
the evolution of the temps to perms ratio is slightly smoothed, up to 2019Q4; to fully capture the dynamics
in the Covid-19 Recession, we left these without smoothing. The quarters in the pre-2008 recession era are
marked in blue, the twin recessions of the Great Recession in thicker red (the short intervening period in
orange), the post-Great Recession recovery in green and Covid-19 in thicker black (color figure online)
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Construction and Repair (see, respectively, panels (a) and (b) in Fig. 9) and somewhat
steeper effects (almost a vertical line) in Hospitality, Retail, and Transport (HRT) and
in Services (see, respectively, panels (c) and (d) in Fig. 9).34 In contrast to the market
sector, the public sector first sees an increase of perm hours and does not shed temp
hours as fast as other sectors; see panel (e) in Fig. 9. However, in the second half of the
recession there is a substantial drop in temp hours while perm hours stay stable. This
suggests the public sector acted as a reservoir of employment early in the recession, but
after the 2011 Eurozone crisis it was forced to adjust its workforce, and did so in the
same way as other sectors started to cut hours at the beginning of the Great Recession,
by cutting out temps. Further, focusing on the initial phases of the recovery—from
2013 to 2016, we note that the clockwise loop appears most pronounced in stable or
declining sectors, where the onset of recovery involves proportionally higher temp
hours. On the other hand, structurally growing sectors such as Services start adding
perm hours relatively early in the recovery, which flattens or shrinks the loop (see
panel (d) in Fig. 9. Finally, again, the public sector behaves differently: Early in the
recovery, it grew by expanding temp and perm positions nearly proportionally, only
to start adding mostly temp hours from 2015 onward.
In Table 1, we summarize the overall hours change and the change in the relative
ratio of total temp hours to perm hours, per industry, across the entire Great Recession
and COVID-19 Recession, up to 2021Q1 (with partial post-lockdown recovery). The
aggregate hours adjustments show the expected heterogeneity across sectors with
higher losses for Construction in the Great Recession, and for Hospitality, Retail, and
Transport for the COVID-19 Recession. But in terms of adjustment in the ratio of total
temporary to permanent hours, note that the COVID-19 Recession comes with (often
much) smaller losses across all sectors (besides the Public, Education, and Health
Sector) than the Great Recession. Given the previous discussion, this is even more
noteworthy: Early in the Great Recession, when aggregate hours losses were lower,
the drop in the ratio of temp-to-perm hours was considerably larger than the drops
reported here corresponding to the entire duration of the recession. Relative to the
Great Recession, there still is plenty of adjustment done using the perm hours margin
in 2021Q1, across all sectors.
6.2 Business closures and business formation
It can be that adjustment in permanent or temporary hours (or both) is driven by firm
closures.
However, business closures in Spain during the COVID-19 Recession do not
increase; see panel (a) in Fig. 10. This is in contrast to the increase in business shut
downs at the onset of the Great Recession and its aftermath. Given that firm closures
in the COVID-19 Recession are lower than in the Great Recession, we can specu-
late that ERTEs may play a role in firm survival by lowering the operational costs of
businesses—allowing firms to stay afloat—with a contractual arrangement that allows
for a reduction of hours without expensive layoffs of permanent workers. Interestingly,
34 This leaves open the possibility that there is a link between structural transformation and these adjustment




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) New Business Formations
Fig. 10 Business closures and new formations during the Great Recession and COVID-19. Notes: Business
closures (“sociedades mercantiles disueltas”) and new business formations (“Sociedades mercantiles
constituídas") as reported by the Spanish Trade Bureau (Registro Mercantil). Source: https://www.
ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736177026&menu=ultiDatos&
idp=1254735576550INE
the number of closures actually seems to decrease during COVID-19, which suggests
that the ERTEs could also help the survival of firms that otherwise would close even
without the COVID-19 crisis; a potential productivity effect/channel that we think
deserves further exploration.
Further, one year into the COVID-19 Recession, the formation of new businesses
shows a substantial increase from a monthly average of 8000 new businesses formed
during the years preceding the COVID-19 recession up to approximately 11,000 new
businesses formed in the first months of 2021—a record high since the onset of the
Great Recession; see panel (b) in Fig. 10. This feature may help to explain some of
the employment recovery that we start to see since 2020Q3.
Given these patterns, one may also worry that be that the overall permanent hour
reduction in the second leg of the Great Recession is driven by firm closure—thus,
the shift from temporary dismissals to permanent dismissals is not due to within-firm
worker-type portfolio decisions, but rather across firms, involving firm exit. We have
checked this in the social security data: For those permanent workers who work in
firms for which we can see at least three other permanent workers in the data (hence,
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we are confining ourselves to reasonably large firms), roughly 25% of employment
loss is linked to firm exit in 2011–2012, somewhat higher than in other periods. How-
ever, the vast majority of permanent dismissals of workers in this type of firms, in the
second half of the Great Recession, occur while the firm continues to operate, sug-
gesting an important role for intra-firm adjustment in terms of permanent hours—all
while acknowledging that firm entry and exit patterns and their difference across both
recessions carry significant interest.
6.3 Parental labor supply
The COVID Recession has put additional pressure on parents’ (or indeed, any carer’s)
time, unlike other recessions.35 The closing down of schools in the first national
lockdown in particular meant that children needed to be cared for at home. Therefore,
parents can be especially affected in their labor supply and potentially respond with
a reduction in labor hours on the market.36 To get a sense of parental labor supply
considerations, Fig. 11 displays the relative (percentage) deviations from trend of the
aggregate hours. We do this separately by category, per gender × marital status, and
separately for perms and temps.37 We use marital status as an imperfect proxy for
the presence of children in the household.38 If one of the main drivers in the drop in
hours/employment is the need for parents to take care of children, we should observe
hours falling more for married individuals—and if the load of care is not shared evenly
among spouses (as it is the case in Spain), then married women should display the
largest fall. We show the 2008 recession to offer a benchmark for comparison, as in
Fig. 3.
On first approximation, we see that prime-aged permanent workers of all four (mar-
ital status × gender) categories experience a drop of over 20% in 2020Q2 relative to
2019Q4. A closer look shows that the aggregate hours of married females experi-
ence a deeper relative drop, closer to 30%. The drop of males is very similar for
both married and singles. The relatively common behavior of aggregate hours in the
COVID-19 Recession, across these four categories, limits the role of parental labor
supply considerations in aggregate hours behavior of perms somewhat.
When we unpack these patterns, we observe that for perms, the hours per worker
adjust very similarly across all four categories in the COVID-19 Recession (while in
the Great Recession, there was very little action across all categories).39 Where we
do observe differences is across the employment response: Employment in permanent
35 We thank the referees for pointing this channel to us.
36 The role of ERTEs here is significant: If parents are in ERTEs, they can easily stay home and take care
of the children. Parents who need to work—particularly those who work outside of the house—are the ones
that are going to have binding labor supply responses. We are exploring this potential effect of ERTEs in
another paper.
37 See “Appendix” for the analogue of Fig. 11 in absolute deviations. Relative changes make more sense
in this setting, since there are more married people in the sample.
38 The EPA does not provide information on children present in the household, but it does provide infor-
mation on marital status on age—we therefore focus on married individuals between 30 and 50 years of
age.
39 See “Appendix C” for the pictures on hours per worker and employment.
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Fig. 11 Relative response of aggregate hours by gender and marital status in the Great Recession and
COVID-19, prime-age adults. Notes: Aggregate hours of married females means the sum of all hours
worked by married females in the labor market. All variables are plotted as relative (percentage) deviations
from a predicted trend that uses data up to the onset of recessions. Note that we have shifted the Covid-19
Recession in time in order to normalize the onset of the Covid-19 Recession to that of the Great Recession.
Prime-age adults defined between 30 and 50 years old.
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contracts of married workers decreases more than that of their unmarried counter-
parts in permanent contracts during COVID-19. This is especially pronounced for
married females and consistent with the parental labor supply story. Putting the hours
per worker and employment responses together for aggregate hours, we see that the
hours per worker behavior in COVID has a rather dominant effects. This dominant
effect of hours per worker is behind the aforementioned large common component of
aggregate hours behavior in Fig. 11 and leaves room for an important role of ERTEs.
Nevertheless, the differences in employment behavior across marital status appear
important and point to the COVID-19 Recession affecting married women in perma-
nent contracts, especially badly. This is in line with, e.g., Farré et al. (2020), who
find employment consequences for women in COVID-19 in addition to an unequal
increase in household production responsibilities.
7 Conclusion
The behavior of the dual labor market during COVID-19 differs substantially from
the Great Recession. During the Great Recession, the initial response was mostly an
employment loss for temps, whereas during COVID-19 employment and hours per
worker drop with perms explaining more than half of the drop in aggregate hours.
With hindsight, we also find that the flexibility that perms show at the onset of the
COVID-19 Recession is in line with the accumulated response five years into the Great
Recession, though with a very much smaller employment response. Further, we argue
that behind the observed patterns of the dual labor market is more likely to be the effect
of policy (e.g., ERTEs), rather than the different nature of the recession. Precisely, we
show that while the industry impact is asymmetric and largely differs across reces-
sions, the aggregate patterns stand within industry. In terms of what to expect from
future recessions, our results suggest that, without ERTEs, the current degree of labor
market flexibility—i.e., post-2012 reform—tends to make the dual labor market more
symmetric across temps and perms but still falls short in homogenizing responses
across perms and temps, in particular, in terms of employment.
Wehope that our empirical description of the differential response of the dualmarket
across recessions helps inform future analysis of the effects of policy, in particular,
the effects of ERTE in the context of structural equilibrium models of the dual market
and its distortions.
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Although the mathematical problem is simple, because it is standard static optimiza-
tion, for completeness we derive here the results.
Proof of Result 1 This can be simple constrained optimization. Rephrasing the prob-
lem, slightly generalized, in Lagrangian formulation












σ−1 − wT HT − wP (H0P + H+P )
− wP (1 − τ)H−P + μ+ H+P − μ− H−P ,
where HP = H0P + H+P − H−P , and the last line refers to inequality constraints
μ+ H+P ≥ 0, with multiplier μ+ ≥ 0
μ− H−P ≥ 0, with multiplier μ− ≥ 0.
First-order conditions are (4) and
dL
dH+P








σ−1 · H−αP − wP + μ+ = 0. (10)
dL
dH−P








σ−1 · H−αP − wP (1 − τ) + μ− = 0. (11)
It follows directly that it cannot be that μ+ = μ− = 0, and hence, we cannot have
H+P > 0, H
−
P > 0 simultaneously, and hence, this possibility of the more general































wP (1 − τ) ⇒ HP = H
0
P .
Using the properties of the production function, in particular the concavity of the









is decreasing in HT . Hence, we can split the domain of HT into
three parts, with boundaries HT , HT , with HT implicitly defined by (12) holding with
equality at H0P , and HT similarly for (13). Now consider the first-order condition
(4) for HT , reformulated with wT /p on the LHS. The RHS incorporates the three
segments for HT , and is a decreasing function, for a given H0. Hence, there is a level
p where this FOCholds at HT , this is p, similarly for p. For any p < p, (12) holdswith
equality, and HP adjusts as well. (This equation coincides with Eq. (6, analogously
for p > p for Eq. (8).) 
B Data: unadjusted data time series (Fig. 2)





Fig. 12 Hours and employment: total, perms, and temps, Spain 1987Q2–2021Q1. Notes: Aggregate hours
and employment are divided by working age population. All variables are reported on a weekly basis. The
vertical dashed lines correspond to the quarters in which the EPA survey was re-designed as described in
the text
C Data: detailed prime-age patterns across marital status and gender
In this section, we report the aggregate hours response by gender and contract type
for prime-age workers, in Fig. 13. The patterns look very similar by gender. Digging
deeper, we split this marital status in Fig. 14. We see here that responses across
married men in permanent contracts appear similar to married men, but this obscured
that there are proportionally less married women working; per working woman in
a permanent contract, the loss of hours is higher. Going to employment in Fig. 15,
we observe the strong reaction for married women in permanent contracts in the
COVID-19 Recession, where there was none in the Great Recession. This reaction
was immediate, while married men in permanent had employment that reacted too,
but build over multiple quarters. Interestingly, married women in temporary contracts
reacted less than married men in the same contract, in terms of employment. Finally,
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Fig. 13 Absolute response of aggregate hours by gender in the Great Recession and COVID-19, prime-age
adults. Notes: Aggregate hours of Females means the sum of all hours worked by females. All variables are
plotted as absolute deviations from a predicted trend that uses data up to the onset of recessions. Note that
we have shifted the Covid-19 Recession in time in order to normalize the onset of the Covid-19 Recession
to that of the Great Recession. Prime-age adults are defined between 30 and 50 years old
in Fig. 16 we plot the hours per worker response. The first-order observation is large
hours per worker responses across permanent and temporary, for all categories (with
the possible exception of women on temporary contracts, which show a large response
that is nonetheless somewhat more dampened compared to the others).
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Fig. 14 Absolute response of aggregate hours by gender and marital status in the Great Recession and
COVID-19, prime-age adults. Notes: Aggregate hours of Married Females means the sum of all hours
worked by married female. All variables are plotted as absolute deviations from a predicted trend that uses
data up to the onset of recessions. Note that we have shifted the Covid-19 Recession in time in order to
normalize the onset of the Covid-19 Recession to that of the Great Recession. Prime-age adults are de1ned
between 30 and 50 years old
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Fig. 15 Absolute response of employment by gender and marital status in the Great Recession and COVID-
19, prime-age adults. Notes: Aggregate hours of Married Females means the sum of all hours worked by
married female. All variables are plotted as absolute deviations from a predicted trend that uses data up to
the onset of recessions. Note that we have shifted the Covid-19 Recession in time in order to normalize the
onset of the Covid-19 Recession to that of the Great Recession. Prime-age adults are de1ned between 30
and 50 years old
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Fig. 16 Absolute response of hours per worker by gender and marital status in the Great Recession and
COVID-19, prime-age adults. Notes: Aggregate hours of Married Females means the sum of all hours
worked by married female. All variables are plotted as absolute deviations from a predicted trend that uses
data up to the onset of recessions. Note that we have shifted the Covid-19 Recession in time in order to
normalize the onset of the Covid-19 Recession to that of the Great Recession. Prime-age adults are de1ned
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